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Abstract
This article proposes a critical but non-systematic review of recent
health care system reforms in developing countries. The literature
reports mixed results as to whether reforms improve the financial pro-
tection of the poor or not. We discuss the reasons for these differences
by comparing three representative countries: Mexico, Vietnam, and
China. First, the design of the health care system reform, as well as the
summary of its evaluation, is briefly described for each country. Then,
the discussion is developed along two lines: policy design and evalua-
tion methodology. The review suggests that i) background differences,
such as social development, poverty level, and population health
should be considered when taking other countries as a model; ii)
although demand-side reforms can be improved, more attention
should be paid to supply-side reforms; and iii) the findings of empiri-
cal evaluation might be biased due to the evaluation design, the choice
of outcome, data quality, and evaluation methodology, which should be
borne in mind when designing health care system reforms.
Introduction 
The 2000 World Health Report pointed out three fundamental objec-
tives of health systems, namely improving the health of the popula-
tions they serve, responding to people’s expectations, and providing
financial protection against costs due to illness. In addition, it stressed
the poor’s need for financial protection being as great as or greater
than well-off people’s, since even small absolute risks may give birth to
catastrophic consequences for the poor.1 In recent years, many lower-
to middle-income countries, including China, Vietnam, India,
Colombia, Mexico, Thailand, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, have been
reforming their health systems to promote universal access to health
care, and improving equity of health, quality of health service, and fair-
ness of financing. Most of the reforms appeal to social health insur-
ance as the main approach to improve health care systems so as to pro-
tect the poor. Empirical results have shown that some of these health
reforms do provide financial protection to the poor but some do not.
Mexico, Vietnam, and China are chosen here as representatives of
health care system reforms to allow for discussion and comparison.
Mexico has been regarded as one of the most successful cases of
health care system reform in developing countries. In contrast, empir-
ical evidence criticises the effort of the Chinese government, which
has poured a sum of public finance into reforms and has planned to
budget more. Vietnam, besides its similarities with China as for social
and demographic background, has been implementing the compulsory
social health insurance programme to the identified poor, which pro-
vides an opportunity to compare the effectiveness of public finance
allocation. All three countries launched social health insurance for the
uninsured poor – Seguro Popular (SP) in Mexico, Health Care Fund for
the Poor (HCFP) in Vietnam, and New Cooperative Medical Scheme
(NCMS) in China – around 9 years ago, thereby leaving sufficient time
for policy evaluation and publication. 
The paper is organised as follows. The following section describes
the health care system reforms in Mexico, Vietnam, and China, and
summarises their evaluation results. Then, we compare the three
reforms in order to discuss the reasons why they differ one another.
These are described along two lines: policy design and evaluation
methodology. Policy design is further elaborated from background dif-
ferences, the design of health care system reform, the eligibility of
social health insurance for the poor, the benefit package of social
health insurance, and the effects of insurance on health-seeking
behaviour. Evaluation methodology covers the choice of outcome vari-
ables, data quality, and evaluation methodology. The last section draws
conclusions.
An overview of health care system reformsMexico
The 2000 World Health Report stated that catastrophic health expen-
diture in Mexico is one of the major problems in the country.1 At that
time, more than half Mexican citizens were potentially exposed to
health-related financial risk, which was caused by social inequalities
in the developmental process but also contributed to deteriorate the
existing social inequalities.2 Since 2004, Mexico has been implement-
ing a major health system reform and has established the System of
Social Protection in Health (SSPH) to overcome the health-related
problems of the uninsured. This was done according to the idea that
health care is a social right rather than a commodity or a privilege.3 An
empirical study conducted in 2002 showed excessive health-related
spending for the poorest rural families in Mexico, most of which was
attributed to outpatient care and medication.4
Seguro Popular (SP), the main innovation of the reform, aims at
Significance for public health
There has been a growing awareness that improving population health is of
significant importance to the development of a society, particularly for devel-
oping countries where the health care system is underdeveloped, fragile, or
vulnerable. In the past 10 years, health care system reform has been under
way in a number of developing countries with a special focus on the poor or
disadvantaged groups, who face financial barriers to have access to health
care services and are exposed to financial risk due to illness. Both of these
can result in the medical poverty trap. In this article we sum up relevant
empirical evidence and learn from past experience in order to improve
future health policy-making. Knowing what really works will allow the design
of better health care systems in the future, which in turn will improve peo-
ple’s health.
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providing financial protection associated with illness to those who are
not covered by any other public health schemes.a Anyone who has not
been receiving benefit from social security is eligible, regardless of
employment status. SP is a subsidised voluntary insurance that offers
free access to an explicit set of health care services at the delivery
point. The three sources of contribution are: federal government, state
government, and families. Families are supposed to contribute by pay-
ing a certain premium determined by family income. However, almost
no family has virtually made premium contributions.b In 2005, slightly
more than 1 billion USD were invested in SP, three fourths of which
was contributed by the federal government and the rest by the state
governments.5 In addition to the necessary stewardship reform on the
organisational structure, Mexico has built up a comprehensive moni-
toring and evaluation system to support the policy design and imple-
mentation of SP, such as publishing a benchmark report on an annual
basis and conducting a longitudinal survey from 2005 purposely
designed for the purpose of evaluation. The issues related to the
provider payment system are not relevant since all the health interven-
tions and drugs defined in the benefit package are access-free. As an
example, in 2006, 266 unique health interventions and 312 medicines
were access-free. It is worth noting that, before the reform, the unin-
sured population did have access to health facilities run by the states
on payment of a user fee, which brought about the high proportion of
out-of-pocket expenditure. Moreover, the uninsured may have suffered
extra out-of-pocket expenditures due to the shortages of drugs result-
ing from budgetary limitations.3 SP made progress in covering more
people, more interventions, and more conditions, with better quality. 
A study on a 15-year trend regarding the evolution of catastrophic and
impoverishing health expenditure suggests that the reduction in out-of-
pocket health expenditure and catastrophic health expenditure by
households is related to the expansion of SP, although no causality con-
clusion can be drawn given the available data. Moreover, the study found
that some key components of SP - insuring the poorest quintiles, cover-
ing medications and ambulatory care, and including a package of cata-
strophic expenditures - are effective strategies to reduce catastrophic
and impoverishing health expenditure.6 A causal effect study analysed
the impact of SP on the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure
and out-of-pocket health expenditure among poor households using
non-experimental data from three different data sources, and reported
significant reduction of households’ expenditures on medicines and
outpatient care, regardless of the data sources. However, the effect on
catastrophic health expenditure differs from data resources.7 A
matched-pair cluster-randomised experiment has confirmed the effec-
tiveness of SP in reducing overall catastrophic and out-of-pocket expen-
diture, especially for the poorest individuals. Contrary to other observa-
tional studies, there was no favourable evidence on medication spend-
ing, health outcomes, and health care utilisation, which may be attrib-
uted to the relatively short duration of treatment (10 months).c In other
words, a change might take place over a longer period,8 given the time
lag existing between launching a new health policy and changing the
health-related behaviour of those treated. Vietnam
Like other developing countries in Asia, out-of-pocket expenditure is
the dominant source of health financing in Vietnam.9 Health care sys-
tem reform in Vietnam focuses on the promotion of social insurance,
which can be dated back to 1992. By the end of 2002, a compulsory
social health insurance programme targeting all poor households and
selected disadvantaged groups called HCFP, had been formally set up.10
The eligible population embraces the poor and some socially protected
groups, such as people of merit, the elderly, and war dioxin victims.d All
the eligible can be clearly figured out except for the so-called poor, who
are virtually identified by existing lists of other government pro-
grammes as well as household surveys.11 It is worth noting that self-
employed workers, informal sector workers, and dependents of CHI
members cannot benefit from this programme.e The HCFP is 100%
funded by public finance. Specifically, the central and provincial gov-
ernments were to contribute 2.5 USD and 0.84 USD, respectively, per
beneficiary per year, though in practice few provinces have done so.12
The programme covered around 15 million people by 2009, 10 which
resulted in a government investment of about 50 million USD. The
insured can benefit from a relatively broad - covering outpatient as well
as inpatient services at all health care levels, laboratory exams, x-ray,
and so on - but unspecified benefit package.11,13 Fee-for-service (FFS)
is used for both outpatient care and inpatient care, which may cause
the supply-induced demand for health care in the context of the social
insurance. In other words, it is highly possible that physicians are inap-
propriately incentivised to over-treat patients. Although some alterna-
tive provider payment methods have been suggested and experimented
with, such as capitation, they have not been rolled out in practice. In
2003, Vietnam Social Security (VSS) was founded to administer all
social insurance programmes, including collecting premiums, issuing
health insurance cards, and reimbursing service providers.
The literature evaluating the impact of HCFP is limited as well as
mixed. By comparing households inside and outside the programme
and employing propensity score matching on a trimmed cross-section
of data, Wagstaff found that HCFP may be well targeted to Vietnamese
poor since it had reduced the risk of catastrophic out-of-pocket expen-
diture but affected the average out-of-pocket expenditure incospicous-
ly.12 However, the same author applied triple differencing with match-
ing to a richer dataset consisting of two rounds of data prior to the pro-
gramme’s implementation (2002 and 2004) and one round after
(2006). The result is robust to the bias caused by unobserved hetero-
geneity. He concluded that HCFP had a considerable positive impact on
the reduction of out-of-pocket health expenditure but not on health
care utilisation.10 In contrast, Axelson et al. applied propensity score
matching with both single differences and double differences to pre-
intervention (2002) and post-intervention data (2004) from the
Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys.14 The authors reported a
small, positive impact on health care utilisation, but a strong negative
impact on out-of-pocket health expenditure. China
In 2003, the Chinese government started a co-payment voluntary
insurance system subsidised by the central government and provincial
governments (NCMS), which aims at preventing rural population from
being impoverished by catastrophic health expenditure. All rural resi-
dents are eligible for NCMS. Given its voluntary nature, participation is
required at the household level to avoid adverse selection. According to
statistical data provided by the Ministry of Health of China, by the end
of 2009 NCMS had already covered more than 0.83 billion people (94%
of the target population). 
aThere are two social health insurance schemes for employees: IMSS for those working in the pri-
vate sector, and ISSSTE for those in the public sector. The federal government partly contributes
and their employers play a role as co-responsible contributors.
bFamilies in the two lowest income deciles and some in the third lowest decile can be exempted
from contribution if they are involved in health-promotion activities. Annual family contributions
range from 60 US dollars (USD) for families in the third lowest decile to 950 USD for families in
the highest decile.
cWhile the baseline survey (before treatment) was conducted between August and September 2005,
the follow-up survey (after treatment) was conducted between July and August 2006. 
dInitially implemented as a separate social programme, HCFP was included into the national com-
pulsory health insurance (CHI) scheme in July 2009. The current national health insurance system
consists of two parts: compulsory health insurance (CHI) and voluntary health insurance (VHI).
eThese people are classified as the potential participants of VHI, which relies on private premium
contributions according to one’s ability to pay.
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Although the minimum standard is regulated by the central govern-
ment, detailed schemes – such as family contribution, local government
subsidy, and benefit package – are designed at the discretion of the local
governments according to their peculiarities. Hence, this system brings
about considerable heterogeneity across regions. At the onset of NCMS,
the minimum required contribution per person per year was 4.8 USD.
This sum was evenly split among central government, local govern-
ments, and households. In 2006, the central and local governments
increased their minimum contribution to 3.2 USD, while the family con-
tribution remained unchanged.15 Therefore, the total government con-
tribution was approximately 2.6 billion USD.f Obviously enough, the
benefit package could not be sufficiently generous in many regions due
to limited financing. In other words, some services were not covered or
were only partially covered, deductibles and coinsurance rates were
high, while ceilings were low.17 Moreover, although all counties covered
inpatient care, outpatient care did not receive enough attention. In
2009, the Chinese government committed an additional 125 billion USD
investment to the health care sector over the next 3 years. 
Several papers using different techniques have studied the impact of
this reform on welfare and universal coverage. Sun et al. used a subsam-
ple of households which had suffered catastrophic health expenditure
during 2004 to measure the impact of the NCMS by counterfactual
analysis. To do this, the authors compared households’ catastrophic pay-
ments before and after NCMS reimbursements. Their study revealed
that, despite a reduction in payments, the majority of the households’
expenditures remained catastrophic.18 Zhang et al. took a random sam-
ple of NCMS enrolees who had obtained reimbursement to apply coun-
terfactual analysis. They found that NCMS could partially reduce cata-
strophic health expenditure and the reduction was in favour of the
poor.19 A significant shortcoming of these counterfactual studies is that
they did not consider the change of patients’ health care-seeking behav-
iour and providers’ demand-inducing behaviour after the implementa-
tion of the health insurance scheme. Wagstaff et al., combining differ-
ence-in-difference with propensity score matching, showed that intro-
ducing NCMS did not appear to reduce out-of-pocket health expendi-
tures, whereas Wu reached an opposite conclusion by employing a Tobit
model. The difference in these results may come from the estimation
method used, the sample, and the information set.17,20 Lei and Lin
applied an individual fixed effect model, instrumental variable method,
and propensity score matching with difference-in-difference estima-
tion, respectively, to three-wave panel data and found no evidence that
NCMS participation could relieve the financial burden, as measured by
out-of-pocket expenditures among patients. On the contrary, the results
of Babiarz et al. are in line with those of Wu.20-22
Finally, social experiments have been conducted to detect potential
problems and explore the possible improvement of NCMS. A social
experiment called Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC) was conducted in
2006 and it i) provided first-dollar coverage for primary care, hospital
services, and drugs with a similar premium but a lower ceiling; ii)
changed the provider payment method for village doctors from FFS to
salary plus performance-based bonus; and iii) introduced bulk purchas-
ing for drugs. Yip and Hsiao compared NCMS with RMHC using a stat-
ic simulation model and suggested that RMHC was more effective at
reducing medical impoverishment than NCMS.23 However, their study
neglected the behavioural responses of patients and providers under
the different benefit package design. Besides, data were based on the
sample which voluntarily enrolled in RMHC, whose health expenditure
distribution might be higher than that of the general population. In
addition, the World Bank financed a health system reform pilot in
Gansu (China), which was composed of supply-side interventions aim-
ing at improving the effectiveness and quality of care as well as
demand-side interventions aiming at expanding health insurance and
providing financial support to the poor. By combining differences-in-
differences with propensity score matching, Wagstaff and Yu reported
that the health system reform pilot did reduce out-of-pocket health
expenditure, as well as the incidence of catastrophic health expendi-
ture and impoverishment.24
fThis figure was calculated by the author provided that 0.41 billion people had registered in NCMS
by the end of 200616 and the minimum subsidy per person per year was 6.4 USD. 
The reasons for the difference
In this section we attempt to explain why the results of health care sys-
tem reform vary from Mexico, to Vietnam, and China. Our discussion will
focus on two aspects: policy design and evaluation methodology. Policy design
The different outcomes observed may derive from several problems
related to the way policies were designed. In this article we focus on the
following: i) background differences, such as social development,
poverty level, and population health; ii) the design of health care sys-
tem reform, including the intervention policy on the demand side as
well as the supply side, and policy implementation and monitoring; and
iii) target population, design of the benefit package, and theoretical
foundation of social health insurance when focusing on the demand
side of the social insurance reform.Background differences
Background differences across countries may be one the most
important causes of policy differences. Namely, importing the success-
ful experience of other countries without taking background factors
into account may not bring about the expected results. Table 1 com-
pares some indicators for social development, poverty level, and popu-
lation health of Mexico, Vietnam, and China. In terms of social devel-
opment, Mexico was on average far better off than China and Vietnam.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Mexico was more than five
times that of China and even more than ten times that of Vietnam.
Approximately 4% of Mexicans were living below the poverty line – only
one seventh and one tenth the proportion of Chinese and Vietnamese,
respectively. However, Mexico had the most serious income inequality
as among households the poorest (10%) represented 1.8% of total con-
sumption while the richest (10%) consumed nearly 40%. As far as pop-
ulation health is concerned, birth rate in China was much lower than
in the other countries due to the one-child policy. In Mexico per capita
health expenditure was much higher than in the other countries,
which is consistent with its economic condition. Despite this, public
health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure and
total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP did not differ too much
on another across the three countries. Besides, all the three countries
heavily relied on private out-of-pocket expenditure to finance health
care before introducing the health system reform. 
To sum up, these three countries were not on the same level when
the health system reforms were launched for Mexico was much better
as for economy and social development at that time. Therefore,
although Mexico has demonstrated its great achievement in health
care system reform, we should be cautious not to apply its experience
in a dogmatic way. For instance, if poor people are extremely poor, more
resources are required to make a significant improvement. Design of the health care system reforms
Most of the health care system reforms in developing countries focus
on demand-side intervention, mainly realised by the introduction or
extension of social health insurance. The cases of Mexico, Vietnam,
and China all fall into this category. As for the provider payment
method, FFS is still widely used in practice. FFS basically incentivises
health care providers to over-treat patients in order to pursue their own
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profit. Simultaneously, as for the demand side, the poor are much more
likely to be over-treated when being insured, owing to the indirect ele-
vation of their financial affordability. The interaction between supply
side and demand side may enlarge the so-called supply-induced
demand, which has been empirically evidenced. Most evaluation stud-
ies have been in favour of Mexico’s SP, with regard to its financial pro-
tection of the enrolees. One significant difference between SP and the
other reforms (NCMS and HCFP) lies in the former offering free access
to an explicit set of health care services at the delivery point. Obviously,
this means that it is impossible to incur supply-introduced demand for
the care covered in the benefit package. Besides, the common ground
of two successful social experiments in China is that the supply-side
intervention was well embedded in the demand-side intervention.23,24
These evidences suggest the importance of building up a right and bal-
anced incentive structure in the health care system. Specifically, more
attention should be paid to the design of the supply-side policy.
Implementation as well as evaluation play an essential role in the
health care system reforms. Hence, they should be integrated into the
design of the health care system which Mexico has explicitly planned to
enlarge the scope of monitoring and evaluation, and which is financially
supported by the regular budget from the Ministry of Health.
Longitudinal surveys have been conducted since 2005 for the purpose of
measuring the impacts of SP on health conditions, effective coverage,
health-system responsiveness, and financial protection.3 Ekman et al.
pointed out that the capacity of policy evaluation should be further
strengthened and developed in Vietnam to pave the way for a successful
health care system reform.11 As already described, in China, NCMS has a
decentralising design and implements local governments. These fea-
tures put NCMS at a disadvantage in conducting a valid monitoring and
evaluation. Patently enough, the county-specific policy must result in the
lack of terms of comparison. Therefore, there is no strong incentive for
the local government to conduct evaluation and improve implementation. 
The eligibility of social health insurance for the poor
Among the three health care reforms, Chinese NCMS and Mexican
SP belong to the universal programme in that all members of a given
population are eligible to receive programme benefits: all rural resi-
dents in China are eligible for NCMS, while all those who are not cov-
ered by any other public health schemes in Mexico are eligible for SP.
However, Vietnamese HCFP falls into the category of a targeted pro-
gramme, which restricts benefits to some identified subgroups of a
given population. In the case of HCFP, only the identified poor and
some socially protected population groups are eligible.
Generally speaking, government subsidy plays a considerable and
crucial role in promoting social health insurance in developing coun-
tries. In theory, by targeting limited resources to those identified as
having the greatest needs, health care programmes improve equity in
a more efficient way. However, to have a comprehensive account of the
situation, we need to recall that: i) NCMS is a voluntary programme
with a contribution requirement from the enrolees; ii) HCFP is a com-
pulsory programme without any contribution requirement from the eli-
gible; and iii) SP is a voluntary programme with a contribution require-
ment from family but, in practice, almost no families made premium
contributions. Seemingly, HCFP as well as SP should be more effective
and favourable to the poor than NCMS since some of the poor may not
be able to benefit from NCMS due to the obligation of contribution.
From another angle, although HCFP and SP thoroughly broke the finan-
cial barrier to health care utilisation, they may encounter shortcomings
such as the limited scope of coverage. 
Where the intervention targets some specific group, it raises an
important issue called identification. In most cases of HCFP implemen-
tation, the official poverty line was employed as an instrument to identi-
fy the poor. This may bring about at least two problems. First, by assum-
ing that the monetarily deprived are those the government wants to tar-
get, the arbitrary attribution of the poverty line leads to random assign-
ment of HCFP coverage around the threshold. Indeed, the households
Han
Table 1. Social development, poverty level, and population health (in 2003, unless otherwise specified). Data source and indicators: The
World Bank Database. Available from: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator.
Mexico Vietnam China
Population
Population, total (millions) 103.9 80.5 1288.4
Urban population (% of total, 2005) 76 26 40
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 32 29 23
Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 62 65 69
Economy and poverty
GDP per capita (USD) 6740 492 1274
Income share held by highest 10% (2002) 39.4 30.3 31.7
Income share held by lowest 10% (2002) 1.8 3.3 2.3
PPP (% of population, 2002) 3.9 40.1 28.4
Population health
Birth rate, crude (per 1000 people) 22 17 12
Death rate, crude (per 1000 people) 5 5 6
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 75 73 72
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 78 62 51
Improved water source, urban (% of urban population with access) 95 95 98
Improved water source, rural (% of rural population with access) 81 78 75
Health expenditure
Health expenditure per capita (current USD) 392 26 61
Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure) 44.2 31.4 36.2
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP) 5.8 5.3 4.8
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of private expenditure on health) 94.7 89.6 87.6
GDP, gross domestic product; USD, US dollar, PPP, poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day.
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just below or above the threshold have similar characteristics but oppo-
site coverage status. Second, it is debatable whether we should narrowly
define the monetarily poor as the poor. Nowadays, there is a growing lit-
erature discussing multidimensional poverty measurement. Although a
consensus about how to measure poverty multidimensionally has not
been reached yet, it has been generally accepted that the multidimen-
sional perspective should be taken when measuring poverty.25-28The benefit package of social health insurance
One of the key components of social health insurance is the size of the
benefit package, that is, which health care services are included,
whether the included health care services are completely access-free,
and if not, to what extent patients share the costs. There is an ongoing
discussion about which health care services should be covered.29 Some
literature or policy documents propose to base this on cost-effectiveness
or cost-utility analysis.30 Other authors argue that the government
should not try a vain attempt to provide everything for everyone with its
limited public finance and health resources, particularly in developing
countries.31 Among these authors, Baltussen has proposed a step-wise
approach to decide the targeting and prioritisation of public spending.32
There is also some literature focusing on addressing the significance of
financial protection in the benefit package design.33 On the whole, these
debates imply a trade-off between efficiency and equity in the policy
design. In practice, these approaches do not mutually exclude each other,
which means they can be applied in a consolidated way and tailored
according to the specific circumstances. In this respect, SP, HCFP, and
NCMS vary significantly. SP has an explicit benefit package consisting of
249 basic and 17 costly interventions, all of which are free of charge at
the delivery point. Out-of-pocket health expenditure is mainly required
when taking interventions that are not included in the benefit package.
In contrast, HCFP and NCMS involve patient cost-sharing. HCFP has a
broad but undefined benefit package covering outpatient and inpatient
services and even some high-tech treatments, which might be financial-
ly unsustainable in the long run even with patient cost-sharing. Ekman
advised providing a more focused benefit package with affordable and
cost-effective interventions.34 NCMS is much more favourable to inpa-
tient services than to prevention and primary care. This system provides
patients with the wrong incentive to over-consume hospital care and
under-consume basic primary health care. Moreover, as provincial and
county governments are primarily responsible for the design of the
NCMS benefit package, the design is very likely to be ineffective and
unscientific.23 A comprehensive account of the key facts about social
health insurance are provided below in Table 2.The effects of insurance on health-seeking behaviour 
The effects of social health insurance heavily depend on how the
benefit package interacts with the severity/cost of disease as well as
with patients’ income. We can illustrate this interaction by employing
a partial rather than a general equilibrium model, i.e. only considering
the possible reaction of an individual to the introduction of a social
insurance scheme without taking into account that the change of indi-
viduals’ health-seeking behaviour might affect the price of the health
care (more broadly, the financing system of social health insurance).
More specifically, we consider a utility-maximisation individual living
in two periods: the current period when they fall ill (period one) and
the following period (period two). Their income is discounted in the
sick period(s) and only the total disposable net income of medical
spending directly contributes to their utility. However, the probability of
becoming healthy in the subsequent period only increases with the
medical spending in the previous period. Put it differently, the medical
care matters indirectly in their utility maximisation but with a time lag.
Therefore, they spend on medical care in period one but not at all in
period two, regardless of their health condition. We may conclude this
after assuming that the government made participation in subsidised
social health insurance compulsory and everyone paid a periodic flat
premium in return for partial reimbursement once any medical spend-
ing occurred.
Given this simple but not too impractical model, introducing social
health insurance may not necessarily improve the health conditions
and/or income of the poor. The intuition behind this model is that, for
all individuals, the first effect of launching a compulsory health insur-
ance is to reduce their disposable income due to the premium charge.
Then, the benefits in return depend on how generous the insurance
programme is. It goes without saying that what matters is to what
extent the government is willing to invest in or subsidise and that the
introduction of social health insurance might create what the literature
refers to as a medical poverty trap. In the appendix we will show how
the poor could be worse off under some circumstances.
The poverty trap is defined as the self-reinforcing mechanism which
causes poverty to persist.35 Many factors can lead to the poverty trap,
such as limited access to credit and capital markets, corrupt gover-
nance, poor education systems, lack of public health care, or poor infra-
structure.36 The term medical poverty trap has been coined to describe
the negatively dynamic relationship between ill-health and poverty.
Four possible consequences resulting from the medical poverty trap
are: untreated morbidity, reduced access to care, long-term impoverish-
ment, and irrational use of drugs.37 Figure 1 presents the pathway of
the medical poverty trap. The scheme implies that poor patients may be
trapped regardless of their health care seeking. Indeed, health care
seeking notwithstanding, poor patients have to cope with the effect of
the reduced disposable income for other consumptions, which in turn
increases poverty. This cycle may not be broken by means of introduc-
ing social health insurance. If the benefit package is not sufficiently
generous for the household income and health care expenditure and if
there is any obligatory contribution, the poor could be pushed into an
even deeper poverty trap. On the contrary, if the benefit package is suf-
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Table 2. Key facts about social health insurance.
Mexico Vietnam China
Enrolment Voluntary Compulsory Voluntary
Eligible population Anyone who has not been receiving The poor and some socially protected All rural residents
benefit from social security groups identified by governments
Contribution requirement Theoretically yes, but practically no No Yes
from family
Scope of benefit package Explicit benefit package: Broad but undefined benefit package; More favourable to inpatient 
249 basic and 17 costly interventions Covering outpatient and ervices than to prevention and 
inpatient services and even some high-tech sprimary care; designed by local 
treatments governments
Patient costing sharing No Yes Yes
No
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ficiently generous, the poor could seek care without suffering an unaf-
fordable or over-burdened cost. It is worth noting that although some
models have been developed to describe the poverty trap caused by var-
ious factors, such as human capital externalities and child labour,38-40
limited progress has been made in modelling the medical poverty trap,
which means that this component lacks theoretical foundation.Evaluation methodology
Given that most studies evaluating social health insurance reform
are empirical works, the selection of outcome variables, the availabili-
ty and quality of the data, and the choice of empirical methodology are
of high relevance to the evaluation and to the future policy design.Outcome variables 
Catastrophic health expenditure,5,6,12,18,19 or out-of-pocket health
expenditure, has been often used as the financial outcome variable in
the literature.3,10,17,20,22 However, the definition of catastrophic health
expenditure itself has a few limitations which may mislead policy mak-
ers. According to the common definition, a household’s health expen-
diture is considered to be catastrophic if the ratio between the house-
hold’s out-of-pocket health expenditure and its disposable income
exceeds a certain threshold. A portion of 30% or 40% of capacity to pay,g
or 10% of total income, has been widely employed in practice.41,42 These
definitions are unable to capture the need of the extremely poor house-
holds which did not seek care or of those households which did not get
sufficient care. Another limitation is that they only focus on the poten-
tial financial risk caused by out-of-pocket health expenditure in a short
run. The introduction of social health insurance improves the health
care utilisation of the poor, which in turn may increase the share of
out-of-pocket health expenditure. If this increase exceeds a certain
predetermined arbitrary threshold, it is classified as falling into the
‘catastrophic’ group, and consequently results in an unfavourable eval-
uation with regard to financial protection. Nevertheless, in the long
run, the poor may be better off when they are enrolled in the social
health insurance thanks to the positive correlation between health and
income. Moreover, as for the same out-of-pocket health expenditure
share, relatively rich people could be much better off compared with the
poor since the rich cope with difficulties in a more flexible way.
The ultimate goal of promoting health care system reform or social
health insurance is neither to lower the financial risk arising from out-
of-pocket health expenditure nor to increase health care utilisation.
Ruger states that clearly wealth is not the good we are seeking and human
flourishing is the end of all social activity.43 Evaluating the impact of
health policy only considering certain unidimensional outcome variables
might be injudicious. Instead, it might be better to jointly consider and
evaluate the multiple impacts of social health insurance within a multi-
dimensional well-being framework. This framework should encompass
not only monetary-related but also health-related dimensions, since, as
previously discussed, they dynamically influence each other but jointly
contribute to the overall well-being.hData
Chapman and Boothroyd argue that the quality of data used in analy-
sis has been frequently overlooked.46 This issue may be more serious
in the setting of developing countries due to the limitations of external
researchers, such as insufficient experience or knowledge of local con-
ditions. Besides, survey data are mainly employed in health care sys-
tem evaluation. Consequently, the influence of survey errors (e.g.,
frame deficiencies, deficient sampling process, inadequate interview-
ing and interviewers, respondents, missing data, coding, etc.) becomes
inescapable.47 Without ensuring the quality of the data, findings can be
biasing or misleading, regardless of how sophisticated the methodolo-
gy. Consequently, this may result in irrational decisions of policy mak-
ers. Most of the evaluation is virtually based on the data from general
household surveys. Mexico is an exception as it has been innovatively
collecting longitudinal data to evaluate the design and the implementa-
tion of SP, thus providing well-tailored information so as to benefit fur-
ther policy design.Methodology
Evidence-based policy evaluation aims at deriving causal inferences,
i.e. at demonstrating the association between two events, where the
second is the consequence of the first. However, at a given time an
individual is either exposed to the intervention or not. Thus, we can
evaluate the average impact of a policy by comparing the outcomes of
two groups, where only one is exposed to the intervention. In this case,
inferences about causal effects can be drawn only if, without any inter-
vention, these two groups would have similar outcomes, which is rarely
met in reality. Otherwise, the overall difference between the groups
consists of the impact of the intervention as well as the selection bias.48
Randomised experiments are seen as the gold standard for drawing
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causal inference. Their essential advantage is that, theoretically, they
allow to create a control group having the same distributions of both
observed and unobserved characteristics as the treatment group so that
the selection bias problem can be naturally solved. Nevertheless, exper-
imental evaluation is at a disadvantage against non-experimental eval-
uation in terms of cost. In addition, its validity and reliability could be
threatened by some political issues, the inconformity between assigned
treatment and received treatment, the poor commitment of treatment
groups and control groups, and so on. King and his colleagues have pro-
posed an approach to design a randomised experiment that is political-
ly robust to evaluate the impact of SP. An experiment is politically
robust when an evaluation is able to survive even if the experiment is
destroyed to some extent due to unexpected political disruptions.49
Needless to say that, all other things being equal, the evaluation rely-
ing on politically acceptable randomised experiment could provide
more robust results. 
To this day, the majority of the impact evaluations employ non-exper-
imental data. A wide variety of estimation methodologies have been
proposed and discussed in the literature to overcome the selection bias
problem, among which difference-in-difference, matching, and the
combination of these two are those most widely used. Difference-in-
difference, a quasi-experimental technique measuring the effect of a
treatment at a given period, has been extensively applied in health pol-
icy evaluation. The difference-in-difference estimator represents the
difference regarding an outcome before and after the treatment
between the treatment and the control group. This technique implies
the requirement of panel data or repeated cross-section data as well as
the specification of treatment and control groups. The strictest
assumptioni of the difference-in-difference method lies in the parallel
trend assumption: all the time-varying effects are common to both the
treatment and the control group, and this can be investigated if multi-
ple period data are available.50 Many studies enhance the comparabili-
ty of treatment and control groups by combining the difference-in-dif-
ference approach with matching. However, matching provides a gener-
al approach to overcome the observed differences between treatment
and control with the assumption that there is no unobserved differ-
ence, which seems implausible. 
Empirical evidences are various as to whether policy or interventions
can be reliably evaluated without conducting a randomised experiment.
In terms of widely used difference-in-difference approaches, a study on
educational intervention argued that non-experimental results were
similar to experimental ones when long series of pre-data were applied.51
Another study suggested that they could only reduce the bias to some
extent but not remove it all.52 Furthermore, another comparative study in
settings of welfare, job training, and employment service failed to find
any approach that could remove the bias considearbly.53 Therefore, more
well-designed comparative studies should be encouraged to assess the
size and prevalence of selection biases arising from using non-experi-
mental data and provide concrete guidance on how to choose a most
robust methodology and interpret causality properly.
Conclusions
In this article we discussed the health care system reforms in develop-
ing countries paying special attention to their financial impacts on the
poor. To tackle this issue, three representative models were chosen, nam-
ley Mexican SP, Vietnamese HCFP, and Chinese NCMS. By comparing
these three models we could make some interesting remarks.  It is rea-
sonable to comment on the single aspects of a policy design, whereas it is
unreasonable to judge the policy design as a whole. This is true beacuse
governments always face various country-specific constraints and trade-
offs. Taking our models as an example, we should be cautious not to apply
the Mexican experience dogmatically, although Mexico has achieved a
very good health care system reform. As far as evaluation-related issues
are concerned, the selection of outcome variables, the availability and
quality of the data, and the choice of empirical methodology are of high
relevance. As observed, choosing the estimation methodology and draw-
ing causal inferences should be done cautiously, in particular when non-
experimental data are employed. Morevoer, it is of significant importance
to check to what extent the underlying assumptions can be satisfied.
Simply applying the popular methodology in the literature without check-
ing its suitability and validity under specific circumstances is not recom-
mendable. Otherwise, findings will be biased and will possibly mislead
future policy designs. Most of the ongoing health care system reforms
focus on demand-side intervention, which primarily work on the scope
and depth of social health insurance. Nevertheless, both economic theory
and empirical evidence have suggested that health insurance itself may
have limited influence on reducing patients’ financial risk. This is the
result of the interaction between patients’ incentive to increase the level
of health care demand and providers’ incentive to increase the level of
demand inducement. Currently, most of the supply-side interventions are
still at the stage of small-scale social experiment. However, it is important
to give more attention to supply-side intervention (e.g. payment systems)
which plays a crucial role in leading health care system reform to the
desired success.
gThe capacity to pay is defined as the effective net income after the basic subsistence needs have
been met. In turn, the effective income is considered to be the total consumption of the household
since in many countries this is a more accurate reflection of purchasing power than income report-
ed in household surveys, whereas the basic subsistence needs are taken to be the total consumption
spending on food.
hWe accept the notion that well-being should be defined from a multidimensional perspective: well-
being goes beyond the pure monetary item or a specific type of consumption good.25,44,45
iWhen difference-in-difference is applied to repeated cross-section data, a further assumption is
that the composition of the treatment and the control group remains stable over time.
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